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Introduction
Since the Central African Republic (CAR) gained independence 
from its former colonial power in 1960 it has failed to establish state 
institutions capable of providing social, economic or political services 
to its citizenry. International Crisis Group (2007) in its report defined 
CAR as a “phantom state” due to the absence of state security forces 
and the collapse of the state institutions. According to BBC News after 
François Bozize came to power through a military coup in March 2003, 
the CAR Bush War (2004-2007) in the north-east of the country broke 
out between the rebel forces under the leadership of Michel Djotodia and 
the government, ending with the signing of the Birao Peace Agreement 
between the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) and the 
government on 13 April 2007 (Relief Web International Report).
A number of peace accords were signed between the government 
and rebel groups to end the conflicts between 2007 and 2012, but the 
most important and comprehensive involved the People’s Army for the 
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Restoration of Democracy (APRD), (UFDR), and Democratic Front 
of the Central African People (FDPC) groups, known as the Libreville 
Agreement, signed in the capital of Gabon, under the auspices of the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)  on 21 June 
2008. According to this agreement, municipal and presidential elections 
were to be held in 2009 and 2010 respectively and the UFDR recognised 
as a political party with the fighters of the UFDR integrated into the 
army. A government of national unity was to be established, including 
opposition leaders and a national human rights commission was to be set 
up A disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program (DDR) 
for former combatants was to be initiated (Security Council Report). 
After a period of relative calm, the Seleka group recommenced attacks 
on the government on 10 December 2012, claiming the government 
had not implemented the peace agreements of 2007 and 2008.
The Seleka group, meaning “alliance” in the language of Sango and 
consisting of different armed forces in the north of the country, captured 
more than ten cities and strategic ministries, leading Michel Djotodia to 
announce his leadership of the CAR in December 2012 and Bozize to flee 
the country on 24 March 2013. When Djotodia became the first Muslim 
president of the country in March 2013, violence escalated, and on 10 
January 2014 he was forced to resign from his position due to internal 
and international pressure. According to the Guardian international 
reports circulated of genocide against the Muslim population at 
the hands of Christian anti-balaka militias. According to al-Jazeera 
following the resignation of Djotodia, the National Transitional Council 
elected the mayor of Bangui, Catherine Samba-Panza as a new interim 
president of the CAR on 20 January 2014, however, this did not stop 
the conflict. Faustin-Archange Touadera, a former prime minister, 
won the presidential election in the country held in February 2016. 
By considering the above developments, it is significant to identify the 
driving factors destabilizing peace and security in the country and how 
can the political actors maintain lasting peace and security in the CAR? 
Individual Level of Analysis
Since the country gained its independence, the political leaders have 
been playing a critical role in changing political, economic, and social 
landscape of the CAR. It can be said that Barthelemy Boganda was among 
the most important political leaders in the country fought against French 
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colonialism and the country won independence under his leadership. 
He founded the Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa 
(MESAN) in 1949 to fight against colonialism and racism and  served as 
the first prime minister of the CAR between 1958-1959. With the death of 
the founding leader of the state and the leader of the MESAN Barthelemy 
Boganda in 1959, David Dacko, nephew of Boganda, became head of the 
government, but uncertainty in the country weakened the legitimacy of 
the MESAN in May 1960 and the party was divided into two groups, 
the Democratic Evolution Movement of Central Africa (MEDAC), 
formed by Abel Goumba, Minister of State in the government of Dacko, 
and a group led by Dacko himself, which repressed and imprisoned 
Goumba and prominent members of MEDAC, eventually dissolving it 
and other parties. He amended the constitution and made his party the 
only legal one, imposing authoritarian rule characterized by venality and 
corruption. For instance, the government illegally began to give permits 
for opening a diamond-buying office with bribery. In 1965, diamonds 
became the most valuable export of the country, providing 75 percent of 
the total value of exports (Le Vine, 1968, pp 13-14).
Eliteshave used different ethnic groups and religions as a political 
means to stay in power and strengthen political positions, developing 
and shaping their politics according to their own ethnic identities and 
so increasing political tension and sparking violence. For instance, 
former president Andre Kolingba  (1981-93) particularly strengthened 
his own ethnic group, the Yakoma, by giving them key positions them 
in government, military and public services to the exclusion of others. 
According to Think Africa Press another former president, Ange-Felix 
Patasse (1993-2003) favoured his own group, the Sara-Kaba, and fought 
against the Yakoma. Likewise, Bozize bolstered his own ethnic group, the 
Gbaya, using patronage politics to give his family key positions in the 
government, military and public services. He also increased discriminatory 
and exclamatory policies against the population living in the north-east. 
The pursuit of personal interests by the elite power through the use the 
state power has damaged political, economic and social development and 
led to the emergence of security problems in the CAR.
1993 was to become a milestone in changing the political system, 
as for the first time the people could freely elect their leaders. Ange-
Felix Patasse, the first democratically elected president, came from the 
region of the north, formerly marginalised and neglected by the central 
administration. In particular, the provinces of Vakaga and Haute-Kotto 
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had been greatly neglected, the population being mainly Muslim, and 
successive governments had not provided for their basic needs, whether 
hospitals, schools, companies, or general infrastructure. According to 
International Crisis Report (2007) this led to the emergence of different 
security challenges for the country, the northeast in which foreign and 
local rebels and smugglers operated easily, seeking to take control of the 
state and protect their own personal interests rather than promote any 
political agenda. The rise of rebel groups and the military coups were a 
consequence of bad governance, corruption and discrimination.
Since independence no leaders have focused on developing the 
living standards of the citizens, preferring to reinforce their own 
political power. Although there was a national army of the CAR known 
as FACA, Bozize established a presidential security guard from Chadian 
mercenaries already in the country to protect his government. According 
to Bozize, FACA was a strong army and therefore had the power to carry 
out a military coup against his government at any time (Herbert et. al., 
2013, p. 4). The establishment of a presidential security guard in the 
country divided the CAR military forces. Nepotism was common, with 
Bozize appointing members of his family to strategic state institutions. 
Despite the advent of a multi-party system in 1993, the new political 
dispensation failed to develop the infrastructure or improve the welfare 
to the majority. Rather, it was characterised by meeting the personal 
ambition of the leaders, intent on staying in power, destroying the 
opposition, and ensuring their own political interests. More importantly, 
the leaders had generally come to power through military coups which 
undermined political, economic and social development, notably, Jean-
Bedel Bokassa in 1966, François Bozize in 2003, and Michel Djotodia 
in 2013. It can be said that the elite power in the country developed a 
state-centric security policy rather than a human-centric security policy 
while ruling the state, but the former paved the way for the emergence 
of new security challenges in the country. 
Domestic Level of Analysis
The Seleka group, comprising mainly Muslims from the northern 
part of the country and perhaps bolstered by Chadian and Sudanese 
mercenaries, had three important aims: to topple the Bozize regime, take 
control of the state, and seize the natural resources (International Crisis 
Group, 2013). By mid-2013 conflict had increased between the Seleka 
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group and anti-balaka militias, the latter created that year to counter the 
increasing power of the Seleka group and support the ousted Bozize. 
According to al-Jazeera with the overthrowing of the Christian leader of 
the country in March 2013, anti-balaka militias began to increase their 
attacks on the Seleka groups and civilians, in particular Muslim villages. 
The main aim of the anti-balaka was to force the Muslims to flee the 
country and eliminate all Muslims in the CAR. Anti-balaka is made up of 
three groups: local self-defence groups, former members of the national 
army, known as FACA, and criminal groups. Poor and unemployed youth 
from the rural areas mostly join the criminal activities of anti-balaka, 
and while there is no clear information about the leadership of anti-
balaka militias, it is strongly believed that the former president Bozize is 
the most important figure behind it. According to a report published by 
Amnesty, anti-balaka militias carried out an ethnic cleansing against the 
Muslim population in the country, causing the majority to flee to Chad, 
Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). From 
140,000 Muslims living in the capital before the eruption of the conflict, 
fewer than 900 remain (amnesty International, 2014).
Anti-balaka militias believe that Seleka and its members are ‘Arabs’ 
and ‘foreigners’ and so have to leave the country (ibid.). The militias 
gained power and increased their attacks on the Muslims with the 
arrival of the French peacekeeping missions (Sangaris) in the CAR 
in December 2013. While the French armed forces demilitarised 
Seleka they left anti-balaka with their arms, thus changing political, 
demographic and security dynamics in the CAR. The reason is that 
France aimed to keep a Muslim leader away from the political system 
in the CAR by giving support to the anti-balaka militias against the 
Seleka group. Importantly, it was the first time a Muslim leader came to 
power in the CAR in 2013. France perceived it as a threat for its political 
and economic interests in the CAR. One of the most important French 
foreign policy in Africa is that France aims to bring a political leader in 
power who is working with France very closely and serving for French 
interests. At the same time, the demographic structure in the country 
also changed dramatically after the political crisis began in the CAR. 
While the Muslim population accounted for 15 percent before the 
crisis, the most of the Muslims living in the CAR were forced to flee the 
country as a result of brutal attacks (Al-Jazeera). However, according to 
Zaman as a result of this, the Muslims could not participate in any polls 
in the country held in January 2016.
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Prior to 1993, the presidents of the CAR governed the country in an 
authoritarian way. The first, David Dacko, institutionalised the system 
of a single party by using appropriate instruments, precipitating an 
economic and political crisis. The second, Jean-Bidal Bokasso declared 
himself ‘Emperor of the CAR’, dissolving parliament in 1976 and 
drawing up a new constitution. His dictatorship was characterised by 
torture, brutality, assassination, and oppression, including the killing of 
100 demonstrating schoolchildren. In 1979, Dacko returned to power 
through a military coup supported by France, (Partic, 2008, p. 19-21) 
followed in 1981 by General Andre Kolingba who seized power through a 
bloodless military coup. In 1986, the first constitutional government was 
established, following international pressure, but a multi-party system 
was not created in the CAR until 1993. He suppressed the opponent 
groups and detained many protesters who supported democratic system 
in the country. However, he later on accepted free elections after a strong 
criticism of the international community especially from the US, France 
and the UN (Kleinsasser, 2010, p. 6).
Ange-Felix Patasse was elected as the president of the CAR in 1993 
and remained in power until 2003, having been re-elected in 1999. 
According to the Transparency International during his terms, there 
had been three military mutinies (1996-7), and during his second 
term, relations between the CAR, its neighbouring countries and 
France deteriorated due to political assassination, corruption, and 
abuse of power. According to Transparency International, the CAR is 
ranking 150 out of 175 in terms of her corruption level in the world. 
Christophe Grelombe, a former interior minister, was assassinated 
on 4 December 1996 (Kleinsasser, 2010, p. 11), having unsuccessfully 
called upon Colonel Qaddafi to protect him against mutinies. During 
his administration, three different army mutinies in April, May, and 
November of 1996 emerged, which destabilized political stability in the 
country. France sent 1,000 troops and 100 special forces to protect the 
Patesse government in May of 1996 (CNN, French Drawn Deeper into 
Central Africa Mutiny). In December 2001, the Community of Sahel 
Saharan States (CEN-SAD) established by the Libyan leader deployed 
300 soldiers to protect the Patasse government, but on 15 March 2003, 
François Bozize staged a coup and remained in power until 2013. During 
his presidency, he took control of the diamond sector and granted 
privileges to his own ethnic group. For instance, he appointed his 
nephew, Colonel Sylvain Ndoutingai as minister of mines, energy and 
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water, and in July 2007 appointed him as a finance minister (Kleinsasser, 
2010, p. 6). Economic problems, corruption and political instabilities 
hindered the growth of the state.
After the second term of his presidency, Bozize increasingly 
appointed his family members to strategic state institutions, with his 
son becoming defence minister and his wife being elected to parliament 
on 4 May 2011 (International Crisis Group, 2007). Diamond mining 
had begun in 1927, and had become the most important export after 
cotton, exceeding all other French colonies in Africa (International 
Crisis Group, 2010, p. 1). According to the government, there was only 
one active mining company in the country, Areva (French), though a 
Canadian company began to operate in August 2010 (Ibid., p. 8). The 
armed groups in the country engaged in illegal diamond trading to 
increase their profits (Ibid., p. 15). Despite such wealth, the country is 
classified as one of the least developed countries in the world and among 
the poorest countries in Africa. Even though the CAR is rich in natural 
resources, per capita national income is a meagre 550$, and about 70 
percent of the population live below the poverty line.
Nor did the multi-party elections in 1993 improve the situation, 
as military coups continued to paralyse political and economic 
development. Military power has played a significant role in shaping 
domestic politics, with no president coming to power without the support 
of the armed forces. For instance, the ousted leader François Bozize was 
a former army chief-of-staff, and he came to power in 2003 through a 
military coup. Likewise, the former president Bozize was toppled by the 
leader of the Seleka group Michel Djotodia in March 2013. Jean-Bedel 
Bokassa, a former army chief-of-staff, came to power in 1966 by staging 
a coup against the president, Dacko. The military coup carried out by 
General Jean Bedel Bokassa against the President David Dacko on 31 
December 1965 was caused by loss of public confidence in the regime, 
the ruling elite and intellectuals beginning to question the legitimacy of 
the state and political and economic instability (Le Vine, 1968, p. 12).
Weber and Kaim trace the conflict in the CAR to the collapse of the state 
institutions, and their replacement by armed militias, gangs, and bandits. 
The presidents have not trusted the national army, known as the Central 
African Armed Forces (FACA), preferring to establish private militias to 
protect themselves (Weber and Kaim, 2014, p. 1-2). Due to the failure of 
the state institutions, both the FACA and the Presidential Guard have been 
involved in human rights abuses in the country (Trinidad, 2014, p. 8). 
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Due to lack of security in the CAR, many different gangs, bandits and rebel 
groups emerged. It is necessary to establish a strong and national security 
force to maintain peace, security and stability but lack of government 
institutions has led to the emergence of various gangs and rebel groups. 
The local population in the north have tended to create their own self-
defence militia groups against the aggressive and unjust policies of the 
military services of the state (Ibid., p. 8-9). Political, economic and social 
systems in the CAR have failed to provide the basic needs of the public. 
The collapse of the strategic institutions in the country have sparked 
violence and deepened political crisis.
YEARS LEADERS WHO CAME TO  POWER WITH A MILITARY COUP OUSTED LEADERS
1966 Jean-Bedel Bokassa David Dacko
1979 David Dacko Jean-Bedel Bokassa
1981 Andre Kolingba David Dacko
2003 François Bozize Ange-Felix Patasse
2013 Michel Djotodia François Bozize 
Table 1: Military Coups in the Central African Republic (1960-2014)
International Level of Analysis
There are many actors involving political crisis in the CAR. The anarchic 
structure in world politics stimulates many actors to influence political, 
economic and social dynamics of the country. For example, France was 
a colonial power of the CAR until 1960, having taken particular interest 
in the region at the Berlin Conference of 1884. The CAR, known as 
Oubangui-Chari during the French colonial administration, saw a 
trading post established on the Ubangi River in Bangui. A territory since 
1889, in 1910 France established the Federation of French Equatorial 
Africa to include Congo, Gabon, and the CAR, with Chad joining 
in 1920. Between 1890 and 1940, half of the population in the CAR 
perished, due to colonial violence of the French (International Crisis 
Group, 2007, p. 3). During the colonial period, France created a complex 
social, economic and political structure in the CAR. The colonial legacy 
of France in the CAR has contributed to the destabilization of the state 
(Ingerstad, 2014, p. 59).
According to Martin (1985) since the French colonial countries in 
Africa gained their independence, France has continued to maintain its 
Explaining the Conflict in Central African Republic
94 Epiphany: Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3, (2016) © Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
economic and political relations with its former colonies, intervening 
militarily on the continent more than 50 times since 1960. Without French 
support, no president came to power in the CAR. The second president, 
Jean-Bidal Bokasso, was overthrown by the French military Operation 
Barracuda on 20 September 1979, and France protected the fourth, 
Andre-Dieudonne Kolingba from a military coup incited by Ange-Felix 
Patasse. The main aim of the French military intervention was to protect 
the regime, the interests of France and the French citizens in the country 
(International Crisis Group, 2007, pp. 6-8). The International Crisis 
Group explains its relations with France as “independent in principle but 
in reality dependent on France for everything” (Ibid., p. 7).
The CAR is rich in natural resources, such as diamonds, uranium, 
minerals, gold, and oil. According to International Crisis Group (2010) 
the diamond sector is the most important trading sector in the country, 
making up about 55 percent of export revenues. French companies enjoy 
control over natural resources in the CAR, and have provided political, 
economic and security support for its corrupt regimes In 1995, Jean 
Bedel Bokassa, who worked as a colonel in the CAR military, overthrew 
the first president of the CAR David Dacko with the support of France. 
The main reason was that when David Dacko, the cousin of Bokassa, 
came to power in 1960, he developed economic and political relations 
with China. This damaged economic and political interests of France 
in the country. Therefore, France supported Bokassa to establish a new 
government with a bloodless coup. When Bokassa (1966-1979) came to 
power, he cut off political and economic relations with China and took 
significant steps to strengthen relations with France. However, France 
carried out a military coup against the President Bokassa in 1979. 
Even though Bokassa had a strong relationship with her former 
master in the beginning of his administration, he tended to change 
his foreign policy towards France over time and developed a more 
independent foreign policy. For this reason, France again supported the 
ousted leader David Dacko to overthrow Bokassa with a military coup 
in 1979. After the military coup of 1979, David Dacko came to power 
and served as the president of the country until 1981 (Douglas-Bowers, 
2015). In 2006, France also provided military support to President 
Bozize to strengthen his Government against the rebels (Conciliation 
Resources, 2013). However, when Bozize began to work with China and 
South Africa, France changed her relations with the country. In April 
2012, Bozize gave official license for the South African and Chinese 
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companies for drilling oil (Global Voices). The leaders of the CAR have 
developed strong economic and political relations with the former 
colonial master so as to remain in power. 
The complex dynamics of the conflict in the CAR cannot be clearly 
understood without exploring the role of the regional actors. According 
to the Reuters the moves of the rebels and the mass flow of refugees have 
undermined stability of the neighbouring countries and threatened 
foreign citizens living in the CAR. of a population of around 4.6 million, 
over 2,000 civilians have been killed in the conflict since December 2012, 
and almost 365,000 refugees are in neighbouring countries, including 
Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Congo.
Chad, a strong military power in the region, sent a military mission 
of 5,500 troops to the AU’s MISCA in December 2013 and has played a 
critical role in the changing political dynamics of the CAR. It increased 
its pressure on the leader of the Seleka group, Michel Djotodia, to 
resign from the leadership in January 2014. Most of the membership of 
Seleka were from Chad and Sudan (International Crisis Group, 2007, 
p. 7), and according to a report published by the International Crisis 
Group, largely consisted of foreign combatants with a heterogeneous 
structure of different local rebel groups (Ibid., p. 8). According to All 
Africa website news Chad had substantial oil resources around the 
southern border, therefore the uprising on the northern border of the 
CAR threatened the economic stability of Chad. It has been difficult 
for leaders to assume power without the support of Chad, as Bozize 
found in 2003 then again in 2013 when it was withdrawn. Chad was also 
the most important actor in increasing the political and military power 
of Seleka (International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 8), with leader Idriss 
Deby criticising Bozize for not initiating dialogue with the rebels and 
opposition to solve the chronic security problems in the northern part 
of the country. Particularly, he feared that insecurity in the CAR would 
spread across the neighbouring countries, including Chad, and increase 
the economic and political instability. The violence also affected the 
Chadian traders in Bangui. Particularly, Deby feared that the conflict 
would threaten the security of the oil-producing area in the southern 
part of Chad (Ibid., p. 9).
Chad provided soldiers for the presidential security guard to 
secure Bozize but later withdrew them and released the members of 
Seleka. Deby increased its contacts with the Seleka group at the end 
of 2012, a sign of the emergence of a military coup in the CAR and 
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the overthrowing of the Bozize government in March 2013. During 
his second term, Bozize lost his credibility in the region (Ibid., p. 9), 
making contact with different actors from outside the region to break 
this isolation and strengthen legitimacy in the country and abroad. 
For instance, he signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement 
with South Africa in 2007, seeing South Africa deploy 400 soldiers to 
Bangui. However, Vircoulon sees Bozize’s invitation as being intended 
to sabotage the negotiation process (Ibid., p. 10).
The governments in the region of Central Africa are unable to control 
their border security. For instance, people from Chad, Sudan and CAR 
freely cross the borders without encountering any border security. Small 
arms and light weapons have been easily transferred from the borders 
and armed forces, transnational criminal gangs, foreign rebels and 
terrorists move freely to the various countries in the region. In addition, 
illicit trade and human trafficking is facilitated due to the lack of the 
border security in Central Africa (Ingerstad, 2014, p. 26). The situation 
has deteriorated peace, security and stability in the CAR in particular 
and in the region in general.
According to Relief Web the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been 
fighting against the government of Uganda but also operating in South 
Sudan, the CAR and the DRC for many years. Particularly, the lack of the 
border security in Central Africa has created a safe haven for them. The 
Ugandan army, in cooperation with a small force of US troops has been 
fighting against the LRA in the region, and the Congolese Liberation 
Movement (MLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, provided political and 
military support for the ousted leader Patasse of the CAR against the 
Bozize’s military coup between 2002 and 2003. In May 2008, the leader 
of the MLC was arrested by the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Peace, Security and Active Role of International Organizations
International, regional and sub-regional organisations have been actively 
involved in peace and security in the CAR. For instance, according to 
Al-Jazeeera the AU deployed its peacekeeping operation (MISCA) 
to the country on 19 December 2013, comprising 3,500 troops, with 
others from Gabon, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, and Cameroon. In 
December 2013 the AU MISCA took over the ECCAS’s peacekeeping 
mission (MICOPAX) in the CAR. The main tasks of the African-
led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic 
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(AFISM-CAR) were to protect the civilians, restore security and public 
order, stabilise the country, restructure the security sector and provide 
humanitarian assistance, but the AU peacekeeping capacity faced a 
number of challenges. First, the members lacked the necessary political 
consensus to create an effective peacekeeping operation. Second, 
there was no effective coordination among the different peacekeeping 
operations deployed by regional, sub-regional and international actors 
(Weber and Kaim, 2014, p. 5). Third, the AU peacekeeping mission on 
the ground faced economic and logistical difficulties which hampered 
its effectiveness (Siradag, 2012, p. 250). For instance, the AU Missions 
in Sudan (AMIS), in Somalia (AMISOM), and Burundi (AMIB) faced 
serious financial and logistical constraints. The AU Missions in those 
countries become too much dependent on the financial and logistical 
support on outside powers (Ibid., pp. 237-8).
The AU suspended membership of the CAR, placed a sanction on 
the members of Seleka and imposed travel restrictions on its leader, 
Michel Djotodia. However, many African countries, including Sudan, 
Congo-Brazzavilla, Kenya, Gabon, Chad, Benin, and Burkina Faso 
flouted the bans and welcomed the visits of Djotodia. This exposed a 
lack of political consensus among the AU members, with many African 
countries unwilling to establish a common foreign and security policy 
on the continent. 
According to UN Website African countries deployed a regional 
peacekeeping operation (MISAB) to protect the Patasse government in 
1997. The UN Mission in the CAR (MINURCA) replaced the MISAB 
in 1998 and remained active in the country until 2003. ECCAS also 
deployed a military mission in the country in 2008 called MICOPAX 
to protect civilians and secure the territory. According to Weber and 
Kaim, peacekeeping missions in the CAR should be administered by 
a joint command and the tasks of the peacekeeping mission should 
be identified clearly in order to increase their effectiveness. Although 
regional and sub-regional peacekeeping missions are actively involved 
in security, they have failed to prevent conflict in the CAR, whilst 
institutional competition between the ECCAS and the AU has hampered 
the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. 
According to Reuters with authorisation from the UN Security 
Council on 5 December 2013, France deployed its military force called 
the Operation Sangaris, including 1,600 troops to the CAR on 6-7 
December 2013 to strengthen the African-led International Support 
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Mission in the CAR (MISCA). In February 2014, France also sent 400 
more military troops to increase its military presence in the country 
(Al-Jazeera). However, France’s military mission had a limited mandate 
during the CAR crisis. Its main task was only to secure the airport 
and protect its citizens, but its limited responsibilities reduced the 
effectiveness of the French military mission in the country (International 
Crisis Group, 2013, p. 7). Furthermore, the French military mission in 
the CAR changed the dynamics of the conflict. While the French soldiers 
strengthened anti-balaka militias in terms of its military capacity, they 
disarmed the Seleka group. Anti-balaka carried out ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
against the Muslim population with the logistical and political support 
of France (Ingerstad, 2014, p. 57).
The EU has also been actively involved in the conflict in the 
country, sending a military force (EUFOR Chad/CAR) of 4,300 troops 
to Chad and the CAR in February 2008. The EUFOR Chad/CAR was 
transformed into the UN military force, the United Nations Mission 
in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) on 15 March 
2009. In January 2014, EU foreign ministers agreed to send a military 
force consisting of 1,000 soldiers to the CAR. There are a number of 
important dynamics behind the EU’s peace and security involvement 
in the CAR. The EU involvement in peace and security is driven by 
its economic interests. France has been the most important actor for 
strengthening the EU’s peacekeeping mission in the CAR, the largest 
trading partner in Africa among the members of the EU. Also, France 
was the largest of the EU’s exporters to Africa, with €20 billion in 2010. 
The 2005 EU Strategy for Africa underlines that the EU was still highly 
dependent on Africa’s natural resources. The EU shapes its security 
policy towards Africa according to its economic and political interests. 
However, pursuing commercial interests of the EU members weakens 
the EU’s security policy in the CAR and damages its international 
reputation on the international stage.
Different actors have developed various security approaches and 
policies towards the CAR but this has paralysed peace and security in 
the country. Furthermore, the rivalry between different international 
organisations has reduced the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations 
on the ground, as international operations have failed to prevent attacks 
on Muslims in the country. There has been a lack of coordination of 
peacekeeping operations deployed by the different actors, including 
France, the UN, the EU, ECCAS and the AU, which damaged the 
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effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations. Particularly, France’s role 
in peacekeeping operations has been controversial, with French and 
Chadian economic and political interests in the CAR playing a significant 
role in shaping their foreign and security policies towards the CAR. 
Conclusion 
This research found that there are three important dynamics behind 
the conflict in the CAR. They are individual, internal and international. 
One of the most important reasons of the violent conflict in the CAR is a 
power struggle among the elite groups. Religious and national identities 
of the citizens have been abused by the ruling elites, including anti-
balaka and Seleka, both of which fill the power vacuum by exploiting 
religious and ethnic identities of the nation so as to attain their personal 
interests, to take over the state and natural resources. Economic 
problems and political instability have weakened the legitimacy of the 
state in the eyes of the citizens. In addition, regional and international 
actors have been actively involved in the conflict but their policies and 
strategies towards the CAR mostly reflect their regional and global 
interests and ambitions. This research argues that since independence, 
there has been a patron-client relations between the CAR and France, 
the latter having strengthened its strategic relations in the military areas 
and signed important defence and security agreements so as to keep its 
strategic interests in the CAR.
The research also highlights that that exclusionary, discriminatory 
policies executed by the elite power sparked violence in the CAR. 
Particularly, Bozize adopted patronage politics, and therefore favoured 
his own ethnic group and family in the government, military and public 
services. This damaged the trust between the public and the state.  Due 
to the absence of state security forces, different rebel groups and the self-
defence groups have seen that the only way to protect their interests is 
to take up arms. Poverty and political and economic inequality between 
the north and the south in the country paved the way for the emergence 
of various rebel groups, such as the Seleka group and self-defence gangs, 
including anti-balaka militias. 
This research found that there are the two important reasons for 
the failure to implement the peace agreements in the CAR. First, 
there was alack of mutual trust between the political actors during the 
transitional process. Bozize did not want to share his power with the 
Explaining the Conflict in Central African Republic
100 Epiphany: Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3, (2016) © Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
rebel forces and following the agreement rearmed. He also increased 
his anti-Muslim speeches, exacerbating conflict between Muslims and 
Christians. Second, although the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS) had lent support to the Government of Bozize 
for some years they cut it when the Government of Bozize failed to 
implement the peace agreements made with the rebel groups or fulfil his 
promises. It is important to underline that although Chad and France 
provided political, economic and military support for Bozize when he 
was planning to carry out a military coup against Ange-Felix Patasse 
in March 2003 they did not protect him against the military coup 
executed by Michel Djotodiain March 2013. The main reason was that 
Bozize shifted its foreign and security policy and developed its political, 
economic and military relations with the new actors, including China 
and South Africa, signing economic and military agreements with them. 
The growing relations of the CAR with China and South Africa changed 
its traditional relations with Chad and France.
Developing a human-oriented security policy is necessary for 
removing the root causes of the conflict in the CAR. The elite power 
can only gain the support of the public if they effectively fight against 
poverty, corruption, mismanagement and nepotism cross the country. 
Ending the conflict through the policy of hard power will not solve 
the structural problems of the country. Development is necessary for 
creating peace, security and stability. It is important to emphasise that 
the central authority should not only invests the capital but also increase 
investments outside the capital, in particular the north of the country. A 
comprehensive reconciliation process should be started by the political 
elite with all the rebel groups, civil society organisations, representatives 
of all ethnic groups, religious communities, and intellectuals. 
Marginalization of different ethnic and religious groups can open the 
way for violence in the society. Lastly, the level of analysis is helping us 
analyze different dynamics behind the conflict in the CAR. Importantly, 
each level is interrelated. For instance, the individual and the state levels 
are intertwined but without understanding the international level we 
cannot explore the insight of the conflict in the CAR.
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